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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

REICHS FORD RD. JOINT VENTURE v. STATE RDS. COMM'N
OF THE STATE HIGHWAY ADMIN: DURING THE EXERCISE
OF EMINENT DOMAIN, DAMAGES INCURRED FROM A
CONDEMNOR'S PRE-CONDEMNATION CONDUCT
EVENTUALLY RESULTING IN FORMAL CONDEMNATION
PROCEEDINGS CAN GENERALLY BE CALCULATED AS
PART OF THE CONDEMNATION AWARD'S "FAIR
MARKET VALUE"

By: McEvan H. Baum
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that damages incurred from
a condemnor's pre-condemnation, which eventually results in formal
condemnation proceedings, can generally be calculated as part of the
"fair market value" of the award. Reichs Ford Rd. Joint Venture v.
State Rds. Comm'n of the State Highway Admin., 388 Md. 500, 504,
880 A.2d 307, 309. In so holding, the Court concluded that the
Maryland General Assembly intended to compensate property owners
for a broad array of deleterious effects caused by the exercise of
eminent domain, including damages incurred between the time in
which the property owner is notified of the intent to take the property
and the time at which the property is actually taken. Id. at 521-22, 880
A.2d at 319.
In December of 1988, Maryland's State Highway Administration
("SHA") informed Reichs Ford Joint Venture ("Reichs") that the
construction of a newly proposed interchange would substantially
affect Reichs's 33,000 feet of commercially zoned land located in
Frederick County, Maryland. At the time of notice, Reichs was
leasing its land to Griffith Consumers ("Griffith"), which operated a
gas station on the property. While the notice provided that SHA
would tender a purchase offer within six months, no offer was made.
Seven years later, talks continued, but no agreement to sell was
reached. In light of the impending condemnation, Griffith chose not to
exercise its option to extend the lease term upon its expiration in 1997.
Extreme frustration with SHA' s failure to take formal
condemnation action was the impetus behind Reichs 's filing of a
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complaint in the Circuit Court of Frederick County on January 31,
2000. The complaint alleged, under a theory of inverse condemnation,
that SHA's looming condemnation plans rendered the property
"economically unusable."
Finally, in 2001, SHA instituted
condemnation proceedings and the parties reached an agreement
whereby Reichs would receive $1,325,000 in damages and could
pursue its pre-condemnation damages claim.
With respect to the inverse condemnation action, the circuit court
granted SHA' s motion in limine to preclude evidence of lost rental
income, mortgage interest, and real property taxes. Reichs sought to
introduce the evidence to prove damages incurred from the time
between Griffith's decision not to exercise its option to extend the
lease and Reichs's filing of the complaint. The case was subsequently
dismissed.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed, holding that
the already settled action for condemnation was the appropriate
vehicle in which Reichs should have sought inverse condemnation
damages. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to
consider whether the circuit court erred by granting the motion in
limine, which precluded the introduction of evidence of Reichs's precondemnation damages.
The Court of Appeals initially examined whether granting SHA's
motion in limine was proper. !d. at 509, 880 A.2d at 312. First, the
Court discussed the property owner's entitlement to just compensation
where private property is taken for public use in accordance with the
United States and Maryland constitutions. !d. at 510, 880 A.2d at 31213. In Pumphrey v. State Roads Comm 'n, 175 Md. 498, 505, 2 A.2d
668, 671 (1938), the Court of Appeals concluded that damages in a
condemnation proceeding at Maryland common law are measured by
the value ofthe real property taken. Reichs, 388 Md. at 510, 880 A.2d
at 312-13.
Continuing its analysis, the Court of Appeals acknowledged the
case of Shipley v. Bait. & Potomac R.R. Co., 34 Md. 336, 343 (1871),
which established that when the government exercised its powers of
eminent domain, incidental losses to a real property interest did not
generally require compensation. !d. at 511, 880 A.2d at 313.
However, the Court proceeded to distinguish the case sub judice,
explaining that Reichs sought damages incidental to inverse
condemnation, rather than compensation for traditional formal
condemnation. !d. (emphasis added). In differentiating between the
actions, the Court described inverse condemnation as a "shorthand
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description of the manner in which a landowner recovers just
compensation for a taking of his property when condemnation
proceedings have not been instituted." Id. (citing U.S. v. Clarke, 445
U.S. 253, 257, 100 S.Ct. 1127, 1130 (1980)).
Next, the Court opined that evidence of lost rental income in a
condemnation case is admissible in certain instances. Id. at 512, 880
A.2d at 313. The Court cited several condemnation cases involving
temporary takings where the proper measure of damages was the lost
rental value between the time the property was first taken and the time
the property was returned or restored. Id. at 512, 880 A.2d at 313-14.
In reaching its conclusion that evidence of lost rental income and
related damages should not have been excluded, the Court relied on
the facts of Kimball Laundry Co. v. U.S., 338 U.S. 1, 7, 69 S.Ct. 1434,
1438 (1949), where the government occupied a private laundry facility
for the benefit of U.S. Army personnel on a temporary basis. /d. at
512, 880 A.2d at 313. There, upon its return to the private owner, the
Supreme Court awarded damages for lost rental income while noting
that fair market value alone may not suffice for just compensation in a
temporary taking. Id. at 512, 880 A.2d at 314.
The Court next addressed Reichs' s assertion that an inverse
condemnation claim can be made separately from a traditional
condemnation action. Id. at 513-14, 880 A.2d at 314-15. In so doing,
the Court sought to determine whether MD. CODE ANN., REAL
PROP. § 12-105 contemplated the inclusion oflost rent and incidental
damages between notice and actual condemnation in a "fair market
value" award. Id. at 516, 880 A.2d at 316. The Court noted that
common law defined "fair market value" as "what a reasonable owner,
willing but not obligated to sell would accept and a reasonable buyer,
willing but not obligated to buy, would pay." Id. at 517, 880 A.2d at
317. (citing State Road Comm'n v. Warriner, 211 Md. 480,485, 128
A.2d 248,251 (1957)).
The Court, citing Shipley, reiterated that it was Legislature's
responsibility to decide if incidental damages should be awarded in a
condemnation case in addition to the constitutional minimum of just
compensation. Reichs, 388 Md. at 517, 880 A.2d at 317 (citing
Shipley, 34 Md. at 343). The Court noted the General Assembly's past
intent to liberalize both the definition of fair market value and the
damages of condemned property owners. !d. at 518, 880 A.2d at 317.
For example, under §12-105, a jury could consider all diminutions of a
property's value subsequent to the first notice of condemnation. Id. at
518-19, 880 A.2d at 317 (see Mayor of Baltimore v. United Five and
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Ten Cent Stores, 250 Md. 361, 369, 243 A.2d at 521, 525 (1968)).
The Court also explained that one's property can suffer a substantial
devaluation once notice of future condemnation occurs as a result of
vacating tenants, inability to use the property in another manner,
maintenance, and moving costs while awaiting formal condemnation.
!d. at 519, 880 A.2d at 317-318. In concluding §12-105 allows for
demonstrable pre-condemnation damages, the Court further declared
that the statute's fair market value language includes lost rental
income. !d. at 520, 880 A.2d at 318.
In this case, the Court established that a property owner's award of
"fair market value" in a formal eminent domain proceeding includes
pre-condemnation damages. In light of the recent Supreme Court case
of Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 162 L. Ed. 2d 439
(2005), which held that the government can exercise its eminent
domain power even where its intention is to sell the condemned
property to a private developer for economic development, the
government is likely to increase its exercise of its eminent domain
powers. Therefore, attorneys practicing in Maryland need to be aware
of their ability to not only obtain pre-condemnation damages for
clients, but also of their option to assert such rights in an action
independent from a formal condemnation claim or settlement where
justification exists.

